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AbstrACt  this article offers a critical history of the growth of the auctioning paradigm as
a method of radio spectrum assignment in Canada. It establishes the growing importance of
spectrum access as a primary conduit for computer-mediated communication worldwide,
and it demonstrates how the rise of auctioning fundamentally challenges the administrative
model that has been used for Canadian spectrum assignment for decades. the key junctures
raised in the historical development of spectrum auctions include the pioneering theoretical
debates of the 1950s, the fundamental changes to telecommunications in the 1980s, and
Canada’s gradual acceptance of auctioning as an assignment mechanism in the 1990s. the
research is based upon historical studies and scholarly publications as well as primary doc-
uments from the Department of Communications and Industry Canada.
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rÉsUMÉ  Cet essai propose une histoire critique de la croissance du paradigme de la vente
aux enchères comme méthode d’assignation des fréquences radio au Canada. Il établit
l’importance croissante de l’accès au spectre du service de radiodiffusion comme un conduit
principal pour communication médiatisée par ordinateur dans le monde entier, et montre
comment la montée des enchères remet fondamentalement en cause le modèle administratif
qui a été utilisé pour l’attribution du spectre canadien depuis des décennies. Les moments
clés soulevées dans le développement historique des enchères du spectre incluent les débats
théoriques pionnières des années 1950, les changements fondamentaux dans les
télécommunications 1980, et l’acceptation progressive du Canada aux enchères comme
mécanisme d’assignation dans les années 1990. La recherche est basée sur des études
historiques et des publications savantes, ainsi que des documents primaires du ministère de
la Communication et Industrie Canada.
MOts CLÉs  Politique des telecommunications; Enchères du spectre; sans ﬁls  
Certainly the inescapable common property nature of the radio spectrum
offers an enduring legal and political basis for a struggle to achieve for the
ﬁrst time a democratic system for informing ourselves via TV and radio.
—Dallas Smythe (1989, p. 137)
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The great Canadian political economist Dallas Smythe should not have been so cer-tain of the radio spectrum’s enduring democratic legacy. Indeed, the common-re-
source nature of the spectrum has provided legal underpinning for broadcasting
regulation for nearly 100 years; however, the durability of this arrangement is currently
being challenged worldwide. The year after Dallas Smythe published the article from
which this quotation is taken, a new spectrum assignment process was launched in
New Zealand that would alter the course of national spectrum distribution policies
across the globe—and move the “inescapable common property” of spectrum into
the realm of private ownership. Since that ﬁrst spectrum auction in 1990, auctioning
has become the preferred method of spectrum assignment by many governments,
placing proprietary rules upon a resource the title for which, Smythe had argued, “does
not rest with particular individuals or nations, but with all humanity” (Smythe, 1987,
p. 264).1 The growth of the auctioning paradigm marks a fundamental shift from the
administrative approach to spectrum assignment that had been prevalent for the pre-
vious century to a market-based process based on classical economic models.
The Radiocommunication Act deﬁnes the radio spectrum as a subset of the elec-
tromagnetic waves that lie below 3000 gigahertz (GHz = billions of cycles per second).
Auctions are the latest development in over 100 years of divvying up radio frequencies:
a complex governance process that encompasses international agreements (the
International Telecommunication Union), supranational accords (the three global re-
gions set by the ITU,2 the European Union), and national governments. The purpose
of this article is to contribute to the work on the wider political economy of spectrum
policy by providing a critical history of the development of spectrum auctions in
Canada. I use the term “critical history” because the story of spectrum assignment is
always one of power dynamics and indicative of wider social concerns. Spectrum as-
signment methods are a reﬂection of the political, technological, and economic con-
ditions of a given period.3 This historic context seeks to augment the greater social and
political signiﬁcance of the 700 MHz auction, scheduled in Canada for 2013.
This article demonstrates the fundamental institutional shift brought about by
the auctioning process via examining the evolution of Canadian spectrum governance
in three distinct stages:
• the pioneering theoretical debates on spectrum auction. including Dallas
Smythe, Nobel Laureate economist Ronald Coase, and a highly inﬂuential
law student named Leo Herzel,
• the dramatic technological and industrial changes of the 1980s, and
• the contested yet persistent rise of the spectrum auctioning process in
Canada over the past two decades.
Spectrum is an invisible public resource that is an increasingly essential compo-
nent of the global digital media superstructure. The drive for further spectrum devel-
opment in the twenty-ﬁrst century has not been spearheaded by traditional
broadcasters (TV and radio) but by wireless digital industries that have been leading
growth in communication sectors across the globe. In an interview with Barbara Crow
for the collection the Wireless spectrum: the Politics, Practices and Poetics of Mobile
Media, artist Julian Priests describes spectrum as “an inﬁnitely rewritable medium, a
space of endless possibility, the space of all possible information transactions” (Crow,
Sawchuk, & Longford, 2010, p. 146).  Radio and television broadcasters’ relatively com-
fortable spectrum positions that have been in place for decades are now challenged
by newer industries such as cellphone and wireless broadband providers, eager to ac-
quire an increased piece of this limited, but non-depletable public resource.
Dallas Smythe emphatically challenged the use of auction as a spectrum assign-
ment tool since the concept ﬁrst appeared as a strictly academic debate in 1952. Despite
his efforts, even the most adamant Smythe supporter would have to concede that his
struggle against auctioning spectrum has been effectively lost. Variations of the auc-
tioning process exist in different jurisdictions, but governments across the globe have
been attracted to the relatively transparent process and enormous revenues to be gen-
erated by allowing companies to bid on the exclusive rights to spectrum use. The in-
ternational transition to digital television has not been prompted by the desire of
governments to bring high-deﬁnition TV to the masses (though the sale of new digital
televisions was certainly a contributing factor); the true driving force is digital trans-
mission’s more economic use of spectrum, which has allowed for valuable broadcast-
quality frequencies (the digital dividend) to be cleared and sold by governments via
auction (Taylor, 2010). Of the options available to nations on how best to utilize the
digital dividend—including, but by no means limited to, public safety and health sys-
tem infrastructure—it is market-based auctions that have increasingly become the
preferred choice for governments.
Any spectrum auction debate in the academic community hitherto has been dom-
inated by economists at the international and Canadian level (Cave, Doyle, & Webb,
2007; Hazlett & Muñoz, 2004; Noam, 1998; for Canada, see Cave & Foster, 2010; French,
2008). Despite the spectrum’s place as an increasingly vital method of transmission
for a range of digital applications, recent work from Canadian critical communication
scholars has been limited (Longford, 2008). Canadian communication scholarship has
beneﬁted from excellent work in broadcasting (Peers, 1969, 1979; Raboy, 1990; Vipond,
1992) and telecommunications history (Babe, 1990; Mussio, 2001; Rideout, 2003;
Winseck, 1998); however, the central presence of the radio spectrum has been by and
large taken for granted. The inherently interdisciplinary nature of spectrum governance
and the central normative questions surrounding the privatization of a public resource
are such that critical communication scholarship is an entirely appropriate vehicle to
address this signiﬁcant and timely issue.
The transfer of digital data is increasingly happening between untethered portable
devices. With the sale of each new smartphone and tablet (the fastest-growing sectors
of the computer industry), demand for wireless broadband access jumps. As Gordon
Gow and Richard Smith (2006) observe, “the radio spectrum is a resource that supports
a high stakes game of ‘technology, industry, money and power.’ Over the past century
this has always been true, but today it is more so than ever before” (p. 5). According to
a 2011 report from the ITU, global mobile-broadband subscriptions have grown 45%
annually over the past four years, and today there are twice as many mobile-broadband
as ﬁxed broadband subscriptions worldwide (International Telecommunication Union,
2011. p. 2). In its 2011 review the ITU also states: “A total of 159 economies worldwide
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have launched 3G (third generation cellular) services commercially and the number of
active mobile-broadband subscriptions has increased to almost 1.2 billion” (p. 4).
Although people in developed countries usually use mobile-broadband networks in
addition to a ﬁxed broadband connection, mobile-broadband is often the only access
method available to people in developing countries. Cisco predicts that global mobile
data trafﬁc will increase 26-fold between 2010 and 2015 (Cisco, 2011).
Given the enormous potential, it is little wonder there is a rush of digital prospec-
tors hoping to stake a claim on humanity’s common property. The wired world is be-
coming increasingly wireless. In their 2011 article “The Next Broadband Revolution,”
Catherine Middleton and Jock Given caution against the commonly held wisdom of
continued government investment in ﬁbre to the home broadband networks, arguing
that wireless access is more useful for a range of digital applications. Their essay makes
the bold assertion that “wireless broadband can not only compete with ﬁber networks
in the short term, but that it may become the longer-term broadband solution of
choice” (p. 46). This proposed paradigm shift in digital infrastructure development is
contingent upon the necessary spectrum access.
For Canada, the 700 MHz spectrum auction looms large as a key juncture in con-
structing Canada’s digital infrastructure for the twenty-ﬁrst century. The 700 MHz area
of the radio spectrum is commonly referred to as “beachfront property” for its ability
to traverse large distances with less power and penetrate through barriers such as build-
ings. The Canadian government has completed much of the preliminary work for this
auction. In March 2011, Industry Canada completed a Consultation on a Policy and
technical Framework for the 700 MHz band and Aspects related to Commercial Mobile
spectrum that preceded revisions to the Framework for Spectrum Auctions in Canada
(Industry Canada, 2010c; 2011). In March 2012, Industry Canada released the Policy
and technical Framework: Mobile broadband services (Mbs)—700  MHz band,
broadband radio service (brs)—2500 MHz band, which outlined Industry Canada’s
policy decisions for the 700  MHz band and a plan to hold the auction sometime in
the ﬁrst half of 2013. As of December 2012, there was still no ﬁrm date from Industry
Canada for the auction and no details on the spectrum licence conditions.
There are powerful lobbying efforts at work in Ottawa. Canadian telecom cor-
porations have been amassing great capital reserves and recruiting former politicians
to their board of directors in preparation for the 700 MHz auction. In the summer
of 2011 former Treasury Board president Stockwell Day was named to the Telus board
of directors and former Tory Industry and Environment minister Jim Prentice joined
BCE (Burgess, 2011). The economic stakes are extremely high. The lesser-valued
Advanced Wireless Services (AWS) spectrum auction held in Canada in 2008 raised
$4.8 billion for the Canadian treasury. The 2008 spectrum auction of 700 MHz fre-
quencies in the United States generated more than $19 billion for the U.S. federal
government. Columbia University scholar Eli Noam believes these vast revenues
cloud government perspective on this key resource: “Conceived in the original sin
of budget politics rather than communications policy, spectrum auctions are
doomed to serve as collection tools ﬁrst and allocation mechanism second” (Noam,
1998, p. 773).
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In announcing the 700 MHz auction in December of 2010, then Industry minister
Tony Clement referred to spectrum as “the oil of the 21st Century” (Industry Canada,
2010b). In the same speech, Clement announced that the licence terms for the spec-
trum auction would be doubled from the previous 10-year limits to 20 years. Thus, the
radio spectrum and its methods of assignment are fundamental to how Canadians
will transmit and receive knowledge in the twenty-ﬁrst century. The auction of these
84 MHz of prime radio frequencies will prove pivotal for Canadian communication
for decades to come. 
The 700 MHz spectrum auction is a product of almost 100 years of communica-
tion policy development. In the inaugural issue of the Global Media Journal—Canadian
Edition, Vincent Mosco notes that “current political economy research demonstrates
that media systems in place today are the result of a deeply contested history” (Mosco,
2008, p. 49). This aptly describes the dynamic surrounding Canadian spectrum: a con-
tested resource, where the battles for control often occur at the institutional level, away
from wider critical analysis. The most recent Framework for spectrum Auctions in
Canada was entirely a dialogue between Industry Canada and interested business
groups—there was no non-industrial involvement for determining the future assign-
ment of this valuable and limited public resource (Industry Canada, 2011). The 700
MHz spectrum auction is a seminal communications event with profound implications
for traditional industrial and public interest goals in Canadian telecommunications. 
Spectrum auctions: Early theoretical debates
In the beginning, there was a brief idyllic stage of spectrum allocation … .
Entry to the virginal ether was free …
—Eli Noam (1998, p. 766)
“Free” may be one way of looking at the early growth of wireless communication;
“confused” and “chaotic” may be a more apt description. Early North American spec-
trum management demonstrates Canada’s independent management style, though
in a decidedly secondary position to the United States. The ﬁrst two decades of wire-
less communications were characterized by rampant signal interference and poor co-
ordination between Canadian and American governments. The 1912 Radio Act in the
United States gave the Department of Commerce no authority to restrict the number
of radio licences or to deny one to a qualiﬁed applicant—certainly “idyllic” for a post-
war explosion of commercial radio growth. Though there were meetings between
Canada and the U.S. ofﬁcials over frequency administration, there were no formal
rules, and signal interference between the countries was commonplace. The U.S. gov-
ernment’s legal authority over spectrum in this period was tentative, so no ofﬁcial
deals could be struck. There was only a gentleman’s agreement governing the U.S.
and Canadian airwaves between 1924 and 1932, an agreement that granted Canada
six exclusive spectrum channels and the sharing of six others (Starr, 2004). The
Canadian Radio Branch (under the Auspices of the Department of Marine and
Fisheries) took its concerns to the international level and formally submitted its fre-
quencies request for the ofﬁcial list at the International Telegraph Bureau. In 1932,
Canada and the U.S. reached agreement that Canada would have nine clear channels
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(exclusive and suitable for high-power transmissions necessary for creating a national
broadcaster) and 27 shared (apt for short and medium-power broadcasts)—a minor
improvement over the previous allotment but short of the 11 clear channels Canada
had initially requested (Vipond, 1992).
The ﬁrst U.S. Radio Act viewed radio as an unlimited resource, and radio commu-
nication was a right, not a privilege (Starr, 2004). Early Canadian wireless development
was more structured than its American counterpart, with radio licences seen as “a
privilege accorded only to a few” (Vipond, 1992, p. 152). The ad hoc nature of the early
years of spectrum management served to legitimize the place of government oversight
of this resource for the next several decades. 
The initial signs of a ﬁssure in this tried-and-tested administrative paradigm arose
in the academic community. Spectrum auctions have a recognized moment of con-
ception. Debate concerning auction as a method of spectrum assignment can trace its
roots to a 1950s journal article by a second-year University of Chicago Law School stu-
dent. The clash of ideas that followed included a strong retort from a prominent
Canadian communication scholar and, in 1959, support for the student’s position from
a future Nobel Prize winner in economics. The results of this theoretical debate would
take more than 30 years to be reﬂected in actual government policy, but the echo of
this exchange currently forms the basis for much of the current global approach to
spectrum governance.
The article that proved the catalyst for this movement was written by a then-uniden-
tiﬁed student editor of the University of Chicago Law review. In “‘Public Interest’ and the
Market in Color Television Regulation,” the author’s thesis regarding U.S. spectrum as-
signment was simple and controversial: “to abandon regulation by government ﬁat al-
together and to substitute the market, bringing the market within the standard of ‘public
interest, convenience or necessity’” (Herzel, 1951, p. 811). The author, Leo Herzel, later
described by Eli Noam (1998) as “a law student with little to lose” (p. 768), advocated
not just for a market-based approach to spectrum assignments but to allow consumers
to choose the technical standard for the emerging colour television sector:
The FCC could lease channels for a stated period to the highest bidder without
making any other judgement of the economic or engineering adequacy of
the standards to be used by the applicant. … The market solution would fol-
low the logic of the price mechanism in an economy based on free consumer
choice. (Herzel, 1951, p. 811)
The idea of shopping for technical standards never gained much traction, but the pro-
posal that “[t]he FCC could lease channels for a stated period to the highest bidder”
(Herzel, 1951, p. 811) launched a crucial policy debate. 
The student article might have been lost to dusty bookshelves and (later) data-
bases; however, Dallas Smythe (1952), then a professor at the University of Illinois,
chose to publicly challenge the position of the author. In a rebuttal to Herzel’s article
in the same journal the following year, Smythe was scathing in his critique that the
anonymous author “offers a graphic illustration of the hazards of applying in sweeping
fashion a general body of economic theory to an industry whose facts do not conform
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to the premises of the theory” (p. 97). The need for sustained government regulation
of spectrum is described as an 
engineering fact of life, learned the hard way in the chaotic period of market
control of AM broadcasting, July, 1926 to February, 1927, which led to the con-
scious national decision to abandon the market controls and to substitute
statutory and administrative controls as the basis of our radio policy. (p. 101).
As Smythe notes in his challenge to Herzel, the potential for disorder in un-
governed spectrum was not just a theory; there was clear historical precedent.
The student editor (still unidentiﬁed at this point) did not waver from his com-
mentary and wrote a brief rejoinder to Smythe’s article in which he reasserted his con-
troversial position in the face of Smythe’s critique. In a 1998 speech commemorating
this key policy exchange, the then-public Leo Herzel also claimed that shortly after
Smythe’s article was published he went to the University of Illinois and debated
Smythe on this issue (Herzel, 1998).
While the initial theoretical duel between the law student and Dallas Smythe is cen-
tral to the initial development of this approach, it was when University of Chicago econ-
omist Ronald Coase (1959) entered the fray some eight years later that the argument in
favour of auctioning gained greater academic currency.3 In his 1959 essay “The Federal
Communication Commission,” Coase notes that Herzel’s article is the ﬁrst he had found
advocating bidding for frequencies, and Coase himself reaches the same conclusion:
“There is no reason why users of radio frequencies should not be in the same position
as other businessmen. … The simplest way [of establishing frequency rights] would un-
doubtedly be to dispose of the use of a frequency to the highest bidder” (p. 30). In his
seminal 1960 article “The Problem of Social Cost,” Coase continues this trajectory by ar-
guing that resource allotment is best served by market forces. Though this article does
not explicitly address spectrum issues, Coase begins the paper with a footnote that ex-
plains, “The argument of the present article was implicit in a previous article dealing
with the problem of allocating radio and television frequencies” (Coase, 1960, p. 1).
Despite Coase’s signiﬁcant academic clout, his position was still seen as too radical
by those with access to power. As he explained in a 1998 speech:
In 1959, before my article was published, the FCC decided to hold hearings
on the future of broadcasting and I was asked to testify. You can imagine what
I proposed. When I concluded, the questioning was opened by Commissioner
Philip S. Cross. His ﬁrst question was: “Are you spooﬁng us? Is this all a big
joke?” I was completely taken aback but I managed to reply: “Is it a joke to
believe in the American economic system?” (p. 579)
The disbelief expressed by Commissioner Cross was founded upon decades of consis-
tent government oversight of this limited resource, a process that had created and pro-
tected a powerful American broadcasting and telecommunications industry. The
positions of Herzel and Coase clearly challenged the conventional wisdom that gov-
ernment vigilance was necessary to maintain order in the airwaves.
Further to this series of academic articles in the 1950s, no government action was
taken in response to the calls for spectrum auctioning. Later studies were written in
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favour of this more market-based approach (de Vany, Eckert, Meyers, O’Hara, & Scott,
1969; Levin, 1971), and a strong endorsement for Smythe’s opposition to the Herzel-
Coase theory came from fellow Canadian William Melody (1980); however, at a policy
level the debate concerning auctioning spectrum lay essentially dormant until the
1980s. When the debate was revived, it quickly gained momentum, assisted by the
growth of Reaganomics, leaps in technology, and changes to the industry that left reg-
ulators scrambling to catch up. The administrative model had been the norm for gov-
ernments in all nations for most of the twentieth century; however, the major
technological, political, and economic changes of the 1980s and 1990s would place
enormous pressures upon the traditional spectrum commons (see Hardin, below).
The 1980s: The launch of cellular phones and the end of an empire
The 1980s were a revolutionary period for the telecommunications industry: industrial
empires fell, and emerging powers scrambled for position in the new and competitive
marketplace. The science of telephony made an evolutionary leap in the mobility of
the device itself and in the supporting cellular infrastructure. Hand-held telephones
became less expensive and the introduction of a cellular grid pattern for networks al-
lowed for true mobility, which in turn led to greater demands on the spectrum. In 1982,
the FCC moved to encourage growth in the nascent cellular industry—perhaps too
quickly. Concerned that the comparative process would take too long, lotteries were
held for the assignment of new cellular licences. Under the proposed rules anyone
could be considered for the auction, resulting in an administrative ﬂood of 400,000
applications (McAfee, McMillan, & Wilkie, 2010). According to spectrum auction the-
ory pioneer Paul Milgrom (2004),
Lottery winners were free to resell their licenses, encouraging thousands of
new applicants to apply for licenses and randomly rewarding many with
prizes worth many millions of dollars. Lottery winners were often simple spec-
ulators. … Economic resources were wasted on a grand scale, both in process-
ing hundreds of thousands of applications and in the consequent need for
real wireless operators to negotiate and buy licenses from these speculators.
The lotteries of small licenses contributed to the geographic fragmentation
of the cellular industry, delaying the introduction of nationwide mobile tele-
phone services in the United States. (p. 3)
Though many of those applications were fraudulent and the process was an adminis-
trative disaster, it was also clear from this process that there were many legitimate
providers for this new service. The city of Chicago received North America’s ﬁrst cellu-
lar service in 1983 (Gow & Smith, 2006).
In October 1982, the Canadian Department of Communications issued its Cellular
Mobile Radio Policy and Call for Licence Applications, which outlined its assignment
plan for the cellular spectrum. The assignment process was not an auction or a lottery
but determined solely via the discretion of the Department of Communications. This
process required departmental staff to evaluate written submissions based on the pro-
posed business plan, technology, services, and social and economic beneﬁts provided
to Canadians. It was, in current parlance, a beauty contest. The change in the science
128 Canadian Journal of Communication, Vol 38 (1)
of telephony did not bring about sudden change in the institutional oversight of the
Canadian spectrum.
The technological upheaval introduced by cellular phone service was accompa-
nied by an economic policy shift that would prove no less important. In a landmark
1982 decision, AT&T was ordered by a U.S. court to split itself into six regional opera-
tions (so-called Baby Bells). Canada quickly followed suit. In 1984-85 the CRTC intro-
duced competition in hitherto monopolized Canadian telecom markets, and previous
“natural monopolies” (Babe, 1990, pp. 239-240) in telephone terminals and long-dis-
tance transmissions were also ended. In the 1980s, the telecommunications market in
Canada abruptly and irrevocably changed.
In 1985, Rogers Cantel Inc. (now Rogers) and Canada’s local telephone companies
were licensed by the Department of Communications to provide 800  MHz cellular te-
lephony services in Canada. Each received 25  MHz of spectrum via the established
comparative licensing process. Despite the rapid growth in spectrum demand, Canada
held fast to its traditional place of a strong government regulatory presence in fre-
quency assignments.
Indeed, the Canadian government advertised this position of authority to the
world. In 1986, the Department of Communications published a brochure designed
to promote Canadian expertise in spectrum management to foreign countries seeking
to construct their own systems. The brochure proudly stated, “Canada’s communica-
tion system is one of the ﬁnest in the world, providing high-quality, inexpensive and
reliable services for the entire population”—a fact largely attributed to Canadians being
“world leaders in managing and monitoring the radio frequency spectrum”
(Department of Communications, 1986, pp. 9–10).
In 1990, the Department of Communications undertook a reassessment of spec-
trum policy in order to respond to the changes taking place. A spectrum Policy
Framework for Canada, tabled in September 1992, observed that “[w]ith the rapid evo-
lution and application of new radio technologies, the spectrum is becoming an increas-
ingly congested and limited resource, particularly in light of increasing and competing
demands for new services” (Department of Communications, 1992, p. 2).
Despite the increased demand for spectrum, from the report’s conclusion, it was
clear that the Department of Communications intended to continue Canadian spectrum
assignment using a mix of ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served and comparative processes for public
mobile licences. The support for auctions at the Department of Communications in
1992 was decidedly lukewarm:
Policy Guideline 11—Market-Based Approaches
For competitive licensing, where the available spectrum is inadequate to sat-
isfy all demands or where it is necessary to limit the number of new entrants,
the Department will continue to reﬁne its current approach—the adminis-
trative comparative process, which is used to select licensees from a number
of qualiﬁed applicants. If other market-based approaches are deemed to be
in the public interest and applicable to speciﬁc services or frequency bands,
they will be implemented only after a full public consultation. (Department
of Communications, 1992, p. 18)
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In 1993, the Department of Communications was eliminated and the responsibility
for spectrum management was transferred to the Department of Industry. This switch
coincided with a clear change in the attitude toward the applicability of auctions in
the Canadian context.
The age of auctions 
Concerns over spectrum scarcity led governments to look more seriously into other
methods of spectrum assignment. Spectrum was increasingly coveted, and there was
concern this would lead to what Garrett Hardin coined in 1968 “The Tragedy of the
Commons”:
Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try
to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement
may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching,
and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying
capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the
day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this
point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy.
Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd with-
out limit—in a world that is limited. (p. 1244)
Indeed, by the 1990s the digital herd was fast increasing.
In 1993, President Bill Clinton signed the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993, giv-
ing the FCC the right to sell spectrum (McAfee et al., 2010). This was cheered by a
range of advocates who looked upon these auctions as a painless cure for government
ﬁscal imbalances. William Saﬁre wrote an essay about spectrum auctions for the New
York times entitled “The Greatest Auction Ever,” in which he predicted a potential
long-term windfall of hundreds of billions of dollars and asked: “Where should the
spectrum-sale money go? Toward reduction of the crushing national debt. By recog-
nizing our hidden asset of the spectrum, Americans can ride the wave of the future”
(Saﬁre, 1995).
It all seemed so easy. In 1994, the U.S. held its ﬁrst auction and the government
collected $617 million for 10 licenses for spectrum allocated for Personal
Communication Service (PCS), technology that at the time was largely restricted to
pagers (Cramton, 1995).
Canada moved more cautiously into the auction ring, and the comparative process
for assignments continued well into the 1990s. In 1995, Industry Canada conducted a
comparative review licensing process (beauty contest) of the PCS frequencies. A spec-
trum cap of 40 MHz was implemented to encourage further competition in the tele-
com industry.4 Four spectrum licences were awarded in the 2  GHz band: two new
entrants, Clearnet PCS Inc. and Microcell Networks Inc., were each granted 30  MHz of
spectrum, while Rogers Cantel Inc. and the major local telephone cellular operators
were each granted 10  MHz. The increased competition was short-lived, for Clearnet
was purchased by Telus in 1999 and Microcell was purchased by Rogers in 2004.
The comparative review process had served Canada for decades, but the success
of the U.S. PCS auction proved difﬁcult to resist. The newly formed government depart-
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ment Industry Canada undertook a public review of the administrative comparative
process in 1994. According to Mike Connolly, Industry Canada’s director of spectrum
management operations, the review was an attempt to discern to what extent the com-
parative process could be enhanced to account for the full range of social, cultural, and
economic considerations associated with the award of highly valued radio spectrum
(Connolly, 1997). However, despite the broad range of topics, it was auctions that proved
to be the most divisive issue of the review.
The prevalent political view of the time, manifested in the Liberal government
cost-cutting budgets of 1995 to 1997, was that government deﬁcits had grown to dan-
gerous levels and all new sources of revenue and cost-savings had to be explored. In
February 1996, Industry Canada released its review of the Comparative selection and
radio Licensing Process: Findings, and spectrum assignment in Canada underwent a
fundamental shift. Industry Canada concluded that it would be in the public interest
to establish a new alternative to the traditional comparative selection process that
would feature competitive bidding where reliance on market forces was appropriate.
The auction method was determined to be a more open and efﬁcient spectrum assign-
ment method (Industry Canada, 1996). This was clearly not supported by the Canadian
telecom industry. In the consultation with Industry Canada, 95% of industry submis-
sions strongly endorsed the continued use of a comparative selection process (Glass
& Rhodes, 1999).
The federal government announced in its 1996 Budget Plan its intention to take
steps “to permit auctioning of the radio spectrum, where appropriate, in the future”
(Industry Canada, 1997). Subsequently, the Government’s budget legislation amended
the radiocommunication Act to give the minister of Industry explicit authority to use
a system of competitive bidding to select the persons to whom radio authorizations
would be issued. In a few short years, spectrum auctions had become a prominent
tool in Canadian spectrum management.
The ﬁrst Canadian spectrum auction was announced in 1999, for 40 MHz of the
PCS frequencies that had been held in reserve since 1995 (Industry Canada, 1999). As
a consequence of the acquisition of Clearnet in 2000, Telus had to return 20  MHz of
spectrum in three areas of the country to come into compliance with the 1995 spec-
trum cap. In January 2001, an auction was held to assign the 40 MHz as well as the 20
MHz returned from the Telus merger. Even after 2001, some frequencies in more re-
mote areas where demand did not exceed supply were assigned on a ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-
served basis.
In 2002, Industry Canada felt it necessary to revise the 1992 spectrum Policy
Framework for Canada. The fundamental difference between the two documents is the
change of attitude concerning spectrum auctions. The Department of Communications
may have wished to proceed with a comparative licensing process in 1992, but it was
now clear that the government and Industry Canada had other plans:
[T]he Department has adopted a number of changes in spectrum policy and
management. One speciﬁc example is the Department’s adoption of the op-
tion of using auctions as a means of determining who should be selected
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among multiple competing applicants for radio licences where there is not
sufﬁcient spectrum to meet projected demand. (Industry Canada, 2002, p. 2)
The change from a Liberal to Conservative government in 2006 increased the mo-
mentum for spectrum auctions. The highly inﬂuential 2006 telecommunications Policy
review included the recommendation to establish “market-based exclusive spectrum
rights (i.e., ability to buy, sell and lease spectrum holdings) and elimination of barriers
to the development of secondary markets in spectrum” (Canada, Telecommunications
Policy Review Panel, 2006, Recommendation 5–9). This was echoed in the yet-again
revised 2007 spectrum Policy Framework for Canada, which trimmed the seven policy
objectives of the 1992 and 2002 versions down to one straightforward and streamlined
overriding guiding principle: “To maximize the economic and social beneﬁts that
Canadians derive from the use of the radio frequency spectrum resource” (Industry
Canada, 2007).
The 15 years between 1992 and 2007 brought about a fundamental repositioning
of the Canadian government’s place in oversight of the airwaves. Despite this change
in direction, Canada is still moving too gingerly into auctioning for some critics. Martin
Cave and Adrian Foster (2010) write, “[A]uctions that competitively assign spectrum
are commonplace around the world, but are nascent in Canada” (p. 2). In their 2010
study prepared for the C.D. Howe Institute the authors note: “The United States leads
in auctions with over 70 followed by Australia with 35, New Zealand with 10.
Meanwhile Canada had conducted seven spectrum auctions by 2009” (p. 3). A break-
down of all spectrum auctions held in Canada is provided in Appendix 1.
Conclusion
In telecommunications in Canada, Robert Babe (1990) describes political economy as
“policy issues in the context of historical development” (p. 239). The political economy
of this article involves the seemingly procedural, yet truly value-laden policy surround-
ing the assignment of Canadian radio frequencies. Spectrum auctions have been a
much more gradual progression than the current rush to the bidding process would
have one believe. The decision to auction radio spectrum is not a white ﬂag waved by
governments helpless in the face of the proliferation of wireless technology; it is based
upon an economic theory, the real-world applications of which are relatively young.
The administrative paradigm served Canada for several decades, yet governments cur-
rently face great pressure to “strip away all aspects of the administrative regime that
are not related to interference management in a market-allocation framework” (Cave
& Foster, 2010; see also McLean Foster & Co, Cave, Jones, & Lehr, 2007). The original
theoretical outline of spectrum auctions lay dormant for decades until it became po-
litically palatable when the technology of cellular telephony was accompanied by the
neoliberal principles of the Reagan-Thatcher era. Auctions are an assignment method
that is clearly in step with the liberalization of markets worldwide.
This technical assignment process is of enormous consequence for Canadians.
First and foremost, Canadians need to be assured they are receiving maximum beneﬁt
and value for the use of publicly owned radio waves. The expansion of the licence
terms from 10 to 20 years in 2010 has consequently doubled the stakes for the 700
MHz spectrum auction. Given this 20-year time frame, spectrum assignment decisions
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made now will be of great consequence as wireless technologies evolve and new ap-
plications develop. The structure of this auction and the conditions of licences will be
the de facto spectrum policy for the next two decades. Despite the enormous industrial
pressures for a prompt auction, the Canadian government is wise to take a more stud-
ied approach.
There are legitimate questions regarding the necessity to sell the spectrum imme-
diately. The claims of Canadian spectrum congestion are suspect. Bell, Rogers, and
Telus—the largest wireless service providers in Canada—hold a combined total of 55%
of the Advanced Wireless Spectrum auctioned in 2008; however, according to Industry
Canada’s 2010 radio spectrum Inventory, as of 2010 they had yet to launch any services
on that spectrum (Industry Canada, 2010a). Wireless trafﬁc will certainly increase in
the near future, but the major providers have substantial reserves.
The history of spectrum assignment in Canada demonstrates that Canadian air-
waves are subject to international pressures, in particular from the United States; how-
ever, Canada has by and large set its own schedule and policy structure. The radio
frequencies have been a primary transfer system for shared knowledge among
Canadians for nearly 100 years. In a world that is increasingly demanding more from
its wireless infrastructure, it is important to assess Canada’s communications needs
beyond a one-time injection of funds for the federal treasury.
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Notes
1. There is some debate concerning the accuracy of “proprietary rules” and spectrum auctions.
Economist and former CRTC commissioner Richard French (2008) argues, “Governments do not, then,
sell property rights in spectrum (the uses are determined by the ITU). They assign licences to ﬁrms or
public institutions which convey to the latter rights to use the spectrum for speciﬁed purposes under
speciﬁed terms and conditions, including geographical delimitations” (French, 2008) However, in an
article in the Atlantic Institute for Market studies, Ian Munro supports an auctioning system designed
“to give licences strong property-right characteristics” (Munro, 2009, p. 16)—a point he reiterated at
an Industry Canada roundtable in 2010 (see also Johannes Bauer in Mansell, 2002). 
2. Region 1 (Africa and Europe), Region 2 (Americas), and Region 3 (Asia and Australasia).
3. Though the words “allocation,” “allotment,” and “assignment” often appear as interchangeable in
the literature, the ITU radio regulations differentiate between
• allocation (of a frequency band): Entry in the Table of Frequency Allocations of a given
frequency band for the purpose of its use by one or more terrestrial or space radiocommu-
nication services or the radio astronomy service under speciﬁed conditions. This term shall
also be applied to the frequency band concerned.
• allotment (of a radio frequency or radio frequency channel): Entry of a designated fre-
quency channel in an agreed plan, adopted by a competent conference, for use by one or
more administrations for a terrestrial or space radiocommunication service in one or more
identiﬁed countries or geographical areas and under speciﬁed conditions.
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• assignment (of a radio frequency or radio frequency channel): Authorization given by an
administration for a radio station to use a radio frequency or radio frequency channel under
speciﬁed conditions. (International Telecommunication Union, 2004) This article defers
to Industry Canada’s Framework for Spectrum Auction in Canada and uses “assignment”
for spectrum auctions.   
4. Some authors attribute the origin of the spectrum auction concept to Benkler (2002). (See also Gow,
& Smith (2006).
5. In 1999, the spectrum cap was increased to 55 MHz prior to the auction of the remaining 40 MHz of
PCS spectrum.
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Appendix 1
Spectrum Auctions in Canada
Source: All Canadian spectrum auction data from Industry Canada (2012b).
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Spectrum Application Results Price
Auction of the 24 and
38 GHz Frequency
Bands (1999)
Accommodate the in-
creased demand for high-
capacity local access
infrastructure required
for high-speed Internet
and electronic com-
merce applications
WNI (later
Mobilexchange
Spectrum) paid
$74 million for 6 
licences;
Videotron paid
$22.4 million for 
92 licences.
$171,838,520 
Not all spec-
trum was sold.
Auction of Additional
PCS Spectrum in the
2 GHz Frequency
Range (2001)
40 MHz of PCS spectrum
(four blocks of 10 MHz of
spectrum)
Rogers won 23 
licences; Bell, 20;
and Telus, 5.
$1,481,920,000
Auction of the
2300 MHz and
3500 MHz Frequency
Bands (2004)
Wireless Communication
Services (WCS) in the
2300 MHz band and Fixed
Wireless Access (FWA)
in 3500 MHz 
Of 842 winning
bids, Bell won
234.
$11,240,615
Residual Licence
Auction in the
2300 MHz and
3500 MHz Frequency
Bands (Residual
2004-2005)
Local network distribu-
tion facilities for the 
delivery of a range of
telecommunication 
services
Following Phase
1, Bell Canada 
exceeded the
spectrum aggre-
gation limit (cap)
and withdrew on
three licences.
$68,700,000
(combined
2004-05)
Auction of Spectrum
Licences for
Advanced Wireless
Services (AWS) and
Other Spectrum in
the 2 GHz Range
(2008)
AWS suitable for high-
speed video and Internet,
with faster access for
cellphones, Smartphones,
and other hand-held 
devices
40 MHz set aside
exclusively for
new entrants. 
The other 65 MHz
available to all
bidders.
$4,254,710,327
Auction for Spectrum
Licences in the
Bands 849-51 MHz
and 894-96 MHz for
Air-Ground Services
(May 2009)
Two national spectrum 
licences to facilitate the
provision of new ground-
air services such as
broadband internet 
access
Won by SkySurf
Canada
Communications
Inc.
$2,100,007
Auction of Residual
Spectrum Licences
in the 2300 MHz and
3500 MHz Bands
(2009)
Auctioning the 10 
licences that did not 
receive bids in 2005,
largely rural and 
northern markets
Broadpoint
Telecom Inc. won
six of 10 licences.
$415,776
